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Abstract
This paper embeds real options in an investment game of in-
complete information in a duopolistic market, where product market
competition inﬂuences the state value of the investment, and entry
times are endogenously determined. The model incorporates private
information over types and unveils new features of strategic interac-
tions in imperfectly competitive markets when ﬁrms are faced with
the trade-oﬀ between commitment and ﬂexibility under demand un-
certainty. The paper illustrates that type-asymmetry and/or initial
demand level alone, as have been previously adopted in the litera-
ture, are insuﬃcient criteria upon which endogenous roles under un-
certainty may be determined when ﬁrms have private information over
their types. Rather, the ex post market structure is determined by
threshold functions whose images lie in the type-space of the ﬁrms.
These functions, therefore, specify, ex ante, the ﬁrms’ optimal strate-
gies, which may involve (anti)-coordination. The model is extended to
consider the plausible case where a ﬁrm is able to credibly “fool” its
rival by masking its type. The threshold functions, and thus, ex post
market structures obtained in equilibrium are found to be characteris-
tically the same as with when types are truthfully revealed. Therefore,
the competitive behaviour of ﬁrms remain the same whether or not
there are industry regulations that make it illegal for ﬁrms to falsify,
mask, or lie about their proﬁts.
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Firms are often called upon to make irreversible investment decisions in the
face of uncertainty about future demand, and incomplete information over
the competitiveness of the rivals with whom they might be competing for
market share. There are beneﬁts to delaying investment until a future pe-
riod when the uncertain elements of market fundamentals become revealed.
However, there are potential costs of waiting, both in terms of foregone mar-
ket activity and in losing the opportunity to preempt ones rivals. There is
thus, a trade-oﬀ between commitment and ﬂexibility.
This trade-oﬀ is central to the derivation of optimal investment decisions
in strategic investment problems under uncertainty. In a new market, for
instance, there may be inherent uncertainty about the scale of future de-
mand, cost functions of potential competitors, market price of commodities
etc. An optimal investment strategy must, therefore, be based on a proper
consideration of the strategic value of ﬂexibility against the opportunity
cost of early commitment. By committing to an irreversible investment at
an early stage, a ﬁrm may obtain a ﬁrst-mover advantage in the form of a
lower production cost, earning monopoly rents, or emerging as the Stackel-
berg leader in the subsequent stage. These beneﬁts may however, be eroded
away if market conditions become unfavourable, as the ﬁrm cannot simply
recover its initial investment outlay. As a result, a ﬁrm’s ability to delay
making such investment until a later time, when more information arrives,
that fully or partially resolves some, or all, of the uncertain elements in the
market, is immensely valuable.
In most industries, ﬁrms are often able to exercise this ﬂexibility when
faced with investment opportunities under uncertainty. Which is why in
practice, it is observed that ﬁrms do not invest in capital projects until
price rises substantially above long-run average cost. This is in sharp con-
trast to the theoretical provision of the discounted cash ﬂow (DCF) analysis
or conventional net present value (NPV) approach to valuing investments.
The DCF analysis speciﬁes that an investment opportunity is viable when-
ever the discounted income ﬂow is at least equal to the cost of investment
(otherwise known as the Marshallian trigger). This trigger is, in general,
less than what is observed in reality. The main shortcoming of this method
is its inability to factor-in operating ﬂexibility, i.e. the ability of manage-
ment to make, revise or alter planned investment decisions as uncertainty
gets resolved over time. It inherently assumes investment opportunities are
“now-or-never” in nature, and hence, ignores the value of ﬂexibility. To
address this problem, an option-based valuation approach has been pro-
posed as a tool capable of capturing managerial ﬂexibility. It provides a
dynamic decision making framework that aﬀords ﬁrms the opportunity to
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available that could inﬂuence both the timing and the level of investment.
The real options literature emphasizes the value of this sort of ﬂexibility
and derives the optimal time to make an investment, when its value is deter-
mined, in part, by an exogenous stochastic variable e.g. the market price of a
commodity. The literature presents various examples of ﬂexible investment
strategy in non-strategic (monopoly) and strategic (oligopoly) investments
(e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Huisman and Kort (1999), Takashima et al.
(2007), Masaaki and Takashi (2005)). The general idea is that the strate-
gic option value of waiting is lower under preemption than in a monopoly.
This is because preemption erodes the option value of waiting for more in-
formation. Firms in these models, and in many others in the real options
literature, are assumed to be non-atomic, and have no real inﬂuence on the
macro-structure of the market. The ﬁrms are price-takers – competing in
perfectly competitive markets. As such, optimal investment strategies de-
rived in these models do not naturally generalize to industries where product
market competition partly determines the value of the investment.
The reason this is important is that most markets of interest are less than
perfectly competitive, particularly if they involve large sunk costs. A ﬁrm
can consistently earn economic rents in such markets which are non-existent
in a perfectly competitive market. The ability to sustain these economic
rents over the life (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) of a real asset has very signiﬁcant im-
pact on the value of the asset. Hence, in a perfectly competitive market, the
state value of an investment opportunity with an inﬁnite life is determined
by the maximum of the expected discounted cash inﬂows net initial invest-
ment outlay and the deferment value; on the other hand, the state value
in an imperfectly competitive market is determined by the outcome of the
game that describes the market structure, i.e. Nash-Cournot, Stackelberg,
or Monopoly. Therefore, as observed, for example, by Smit and Ankum
(1993) and Smit and Trigeorgis (1995), and others, an options-based ap-
proach to strategic investment needs to be considered from the perspective
of competitive market structure.
The manner in which the burden of uncertainty has been introduced in
the literature on investment decision models in imperfect markets warrants
some consideration. Most authors introduce uncertainty in terms of insuf-
ﬁcient strategic information, for example, as private information on cost
functions or some other form of idiosyncratic shock that is peculiar to indi-
vidual ﬁrms. The other common form is the generic uncertainty that aﬀects
all ﬁrms in an equal way e.g. the move of nature at the start of a game of
imperfect information. Unfortunately, most of these papers appear to in-
discriminately introduce uncertainty in one of these forms, either in the bid
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a number of questions that beg for answers. For example, which form of
uncertainty best describes reality? Which form most inﬂuences outcomes
in the games, vis-` a-vis ﬁrst and second mover advantages? Or perhaps, is
there an interactive eﬀect that may be responsible for some of the counter-
intuitive outcomes in existing models? Fortunately, the options valuation
approach adopted in this paper allows us to address these concerns in a very
comprehensive manner that buttresses the impact of uncertainty (in either,
or both forms) in investment games. Our aim is to model irreversible invest-
ment decisions by ﬁrms into imperfectly competitive markets where ﬁrms
have incomplete information about their competitors’ costs, and demand is
uncertain.
2 Related Literature
Optimal investment strategies or role-choice in strategic investment pro-
grams under uncertainty in imperfectly competitive markets have received
some following in the literature. Gal-Or (1987) demonstrates the role of
strategic uncertainty in an exogenous leader-follower model with segmental
private information about the level of demand. The follower is able to ac-
curately determine the leader’s private information by inverting his output
function. She shows that if the leader attempts to deviate from his equi-
librium output (in order to “fool” the follower into presuming that market
demand is low) and produces an output whose inverse image is outside the
domain of deﬁnition of his signals (if this domain is bounded or has discon-
tinuities), the follower may then believe he has more favourable information
than the leader and therefore expand his output. This ﬁrst-mover disadvan-
tage under uncertainty is sustained even when the domain of deﬁnition of
the leader’s signals is unbounded and continuous. In eﬀect, with partially
correlated signals and moderate uncertainty, the leader supplying more, sig-
nals high demand, and then the follower supplies more as well. She also
comments on the possibility of sustaining these ﬁrst-mover disadvantages
in an endogenous role choice model, but only gave speciﬁcations and did
not pursue it further. Mailath (1993) presents a model that allows for en-
dogenous sequencing in an asymmetric information game, where the more
informed ﬁrm has the option to enter a market in one of two periods, but the
less informed ﬁrm may only enter in the second period. The less informed
ﬁrm is able to gain information about market proﬁtability by observing the
more informed ﬁrm’s choice. The implications of signalling distortions in
this game result in an equilibrium in which the more informed ﬁrm always
enters in the ﬁrst period, even when he could have earned a higher ex ante
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the eﬀect private information has on the choice of roles in an endogenous set-
ting. However, having more information does not always confer leadership
rights endogenously. The option available to each ﬁrm inﬂuences competi-
tive strategies. Normann (2002), in fact, shows that when the less informed
ﬁrm in Mailath (1993) has the opportunity to invest in period 1 as well, the
Stackelberg equilibrium with the uninformed ﬁrm being the leader emerges
as one of the equilibria surviving the D1 reﬁnement.
It is curious that simultaneous-play outcome in the second period does
not feature among the equilibria in these models. This may be due, in part,
to the manner in which ﬂexibility and uncertainty are modelled. Under
generic uncertainty, with equal rights to enter the market at any one of two
periods, Sadanand and Sadanand (1996) show that second period Cournot
outcome persists in the set of equilibria, for all levels of risk in the distribu-
tion of demand.
It is pertinent to note that ﬂexibility in these models carries no real op-
tion value, therefore, parametrization of generic uncertainty and/or private
information does not actually make it unproﬁtable to enter the market at
any one of the entry periods, however large the level of uncertainty might
be. This is not the case when initial investment outlays have to be sunk
before production choices are made. For while proﬁts may be earned (con-
sidering interior solutions alone) within the periods of output choices, the
overall discounted stream of payoﬀ less the investment outlay might not just
be suboptimal, but result in an outright loss. Furthermore, investment de-
cisions faced by ﬁrms in the business world very often require such lumpy
investment outlays. Take, for instance, a pharmaceutical ﬁrm’s decision to
develop a new drug. The R&D phase of any drug discovery is, characteristi-
cally, capital intensive. The ﬁrm cannot simply recover sunk R&D costs in
this endeavour, should it become unproductive. Or, in the event of a suc-
cessful discovery, it remains uncertain if the drug will pass pre-clinical trials
for approval or exactly how long it will take to get approved. Furthermore,
other pharmaceuticals might be coming up with a similar drug. These,
and other industry-speciﬁc forms of uncertainty bear upon investment op-
portunities in the real world. It often instructs decision-makers to exercise
caution when making investment decisions under these circumstances (as
the ﬁrst-mover advantages and disadvantages are both very real).
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mitment and ﬂexibility in an investment game that incorporates real op-
tions in a strategic industrial organization framework. By developing on
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), they show how demand uncertainty inﬂuences
strategic interactions in environments where the investment is propriety or
shared, competitor is tough or accommodating and whether the strategic
variable is quantity or price. In the contrarian (quantity competition) case,
the game proceeds in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, one of the ﬁrms has the
opportunity to commit to a strategic capital investment that may give him
a cost, or some other form of commitment, advantage over his competition
in the second stage. The nature of this capital investment may make him
a tough or accommodating incumbent in the second stage. The level of de-
mand in the second stage is unknown, but follows a simple binomial process
whose initial value is known in the ﬁrst stage. In the second stage, both
ﬁrms have the option to either invest in the ﬁrst period or defer the decision
to invest until the second period, and then decide to invest, or not, having
observed the favourableness of the market condition. Equilibrium payoﬀs
are earned in each of these periods and during the entire life of the invest-
ment. The value of the investment is derived from discounted cash ﬂows
less the initial investment outlay. They show how the level of demand in the
ﬁrst stage provides critical thresholds that determine the market structure
in the second stage in the three cases where the strategic capital investment
was, a) not made, b) shared, and c) proprietary.
The market environments in these cases can be thought of as being
analogous to having, a) a less eﬃcient pioneer ﬁrm, b) symmetric ﬁrms, and
c) a more eﬃcient pioneer ﬁrm, in a single-stage multi-period investment
game. This analogy allows us to think of this model as one with endogenous
sequencing, and see exactly what drives the choice of roles. The critical
thresholds of demand in b involves a shift to the left of those in a, i.e. with
equal standing in the market (as in b), the deferment threshold is lower for
the pioneer ﬁrm than in a. Similarly, a higher demand level will, in case a,
be required to oﬀset the eﬀect of the initial sunk cost and the pioneer ﬁrm’s
ineﬃciency, before entry may become proﬁtable. Additionally, there exists
a region of indeterminacy, where either ﬁrm may emerge as the leader or
the follower. It is interesting, however, to note that in case c, for all levels
of demand considered, this region collapses to a null set. Therefore, for all
levels of observed demand, the pioneer, more eﬃcient, ﬁrm never defers in-
vestment when the less eﬃcient ﬁrm invests. One of the main contributions
of this paper is to posit that cost asymmetry as depicted in the analogous
framework above, under exogenous uncertainty, does not always preclude a
more eﬃcient ﬁrm from deferring when ﬁrms have private information about
6their cost function. More succinctly, cost asymmetry alone is not enough
to determine endogenous roles under uncertainty. Competitive strategies in
our model are driven by a pair of continuous functions of known market pa-
rameters (initial observed level of demand and the measure of uncertainty)
whose co-domain is the set of types of the ﬁrms. The images of these func-
tions determine critical values of types that specify the optimal strategy for
each ﬁrm.
Interestingly, and contrary to the stipulations in Smit and Trigeorgis
(1995) and Dewit and Leahy (2001) we ﬁnd a non-degenerate region of types
(even for some high levels of uncertainty), where a (anti)-coordination prob-
lem materializes. Cost asymmetry gives no leverage in this region, and it
is never optimal to choose the same action. The optimal strategies are for
either one of the ﬁrms to choose to move early while the other defers, and
vice-versa. This will ordinarily be the case if marginal costs are not private
information at the start of the game. Since each ﬁrm cannot observe its
rival’s cost, its ex ante scheme in this region will be in mixed strategies. By
modelling private information into this analogous framework, we present a
baseline model that allows us to establish how private information and ex-
ogenous uncertainty individually, and interdependently, inﬂuence the choice
of strategies in investment games.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 presents the
model and assumptions, and section 4 describes equilibrium outputs, payoﬀs
and value of the investment in each continuation game. Section 5 discusses
the sequencing of actions based on the observed parameters of the model
and section 6 contains extensions of the analysis that consider outcomes
in a world where a ﬁrm is able to credibly lie about his type, and how
the observed coordination problem might be addressed. Some concluding
remarks follow. All derivations of equilibrium outputs, payoﬀs and expected
values of the investment are collected in Appendix A. Appendix B contains
all proofs.
73 The Model
The aim of this paper is to model environments in which ﬁrms have limited
information about the state of demand and the competitiveness of poten-
tial rivals in a market; ﬁrms’ investment decisions, whilst irreversible once
made, are not ‘now or never’; and competition in the market upon entry
is imperfect. To capture these key features we introduce a dynamic model
in which demand evolves stochastically, ﬁrms have incomplete information
about each other’s variable costs, and in order to enter the market ﬁrms
must undertake (large) sunk cost investment but have the freedom of choice
over when to undertake this investment. As such, ﬁrms face two sources
of uncertainty in the model when making their investment decision: uncer-
tainty over the level of demand; and uncertainty about the competitiveness
of the (potential) rival.
Suppose there are two risk-neutral ﬁrms A and B that are considering
entering a market. The sunk cost expenditure required for each ﬁrm to enter
the market is K, which is the same for each ﬁrm and common knowledge.
Conversely, there is incomplete information over variable costs: each ﬁrm
has constant marginal cost drawn from a distribution F with support [c,¯ c],
which is private information.
The investment game evolves over a sequence of periods 0,1,2,...,n,
where period 0 is a pre-play period. Firms discount future payoﬀs by a
factor δ. To capture the key feature of demand uncertainty but retain mod-
elling simplicity, (inverse) demand is assumed to take the following struc-
ture, which is common knowledge. Inverse demand in period t is given by
P(Qt,Θ(t)) = Θ(t)−Qt where Qt is the aggregate supply from participants
in the market. In period 1 the level of demand is Θ(1) = θ1 for sure, whilst
in period 2 the level of demand evolves stochastically following a binomial
distribution: Θ(2) = uθ1 with probability p and dθ1 with probability 1 − p,
where 0 < d < 1 < u and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 . From period 3 onwards demand
has the same structure as period 2 demand. u and d will be parameterized
to be such that, if ﬁrms know the realization of the level of demand when
making their investment decision and it is uθ1, then any type of ﬁrm would
choose to invest, whilst if it is dθ1 then any type of ﬁrm would choose not
to invest. At the end of each of periods 1,2,...,n the market clears ac-
cording to the total supply from market participants. From the perspective
of period 0 when investment decisions are being made, this simple demand
structure captures the key idea that ﬁrms may wish to delay investing until
uncertainty about demand has been resolved.
We model the investment game between the ﬁrms using the structure
of an endogenous timing game with observable delay, as introduced by
8Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)1. In period 0 ﬁrms decide whether the un-
dertake the investment to enter the market in period 1 (I), when future
demand is subject to uncertainty, or whether to defer making this decision
(D) until period 2 when demand uncertainty has been resolved. If either
ﬁrm enters the market they also have to decide on the level of output to
supply. There are several possible scenarios to consider that are introduced
now and formally analyzed in the following section.
If both ﬁrms choose to invest in period 1, (I,I), then each ﬁrm is subject
to both uncertainty over period 2 demand and their rival’s cost. As such, in
the ﬁrst period ﬁrms compete in a game of Bayesian Cournot competition
with demand level θ1. At the end of this period the market clears and output
and period 1 payoﬀs become common knowledge so each ﬁrm can deduce
the others actual marginal cost. In period 2, therefore, the ﬁrms engage in a
game of Cournot competition either with demand level uθ1 with probability
p, or with demand level dθ1 with probability 1 − p, which is the same from
period 3 onwards.
If both ﬁrms choose to defer the investment decision until period 2,
(D,D), then nothing happens in period 1 and, the level of period 2 demand
is realized as either uθ1 or dθ1 before ﬁrms decide whether or not to enter the
market. If the level of demand is dθ1 then both ﬁrms choose not to invest
in period 2 and in all subsequent periods. If the level of demand is uθ1 then
both ﬁrms will be seeking to invest in the market after which they will engage
in a game of Bayesian Cournot competition, but with updated beliefs about
the support of their rival’s marginal cost distribution since the (observed)
act of delaying reveals information about what the rival ﬁrm’s marginal
cost cannot be. At the end of period 2 output choices and payoﬀs become
common knowledge which reveals the rival’s marginal cost, so from period 3
onwards ﬁrms engage in each period in a game of Cournot competition with
demand level uθ1.
Consider now the case where one ﬁrm chooses to invest whilst the other
defers their decision, (I,D) or (D,I). In these cases the investing ﬁrm enjoys
being a monopolist in period 1. Since their output and period 1 payoﬀ
1The extended game with observable delay is more suited to real-world cases
where there is a lag between investment decisions and actual implementation.
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) ﬁrst propose this game as one of two extended games (the
other being the extended game with action commitment) that endogenize the choice of
roles in a duopoly with complete information. In the extended game with observable de-
lay, ﬁrms simultaneous choose their adoption period in a pre-play stage (similar to period
0 in our model) and announces their choice before choosing an action. It is assumed that
the ﬁrms are committed to whatever adoption period they choose in the preplay stage.
First period Cournot competition emerges when both ﬁrms have downward sloping reac-
tion functions. Therefore, in a quantity competition, under further restrictions to payoﬀ
functions (as in Amir (1995)), the ﬁrst mover advantage is eliminated.
9becomes common knowledge at the end of period 1, the ﬁrm that deferred
the investment decision learns the type of their rival. After the realization of
period 2 demand, this ﬁrm must decide whether to invest or not. Since the
ﬁrm that invested in period 1 has installed capital, it is assumed that this
ﬁrm takes the role of a Stackelberg leader whilst the other ﬁrm is relegated to
making output decisions after the ﬁrm that undertook the early investment,
if it chooses to invest. If the level of demand transpires to be dθ1 then it will
not invest at this stage. If, on the other hand, it is uθ1 then it may. If it does
so it engages in a game of Stackelberg competition as the follower. Whilst
the deferring ﬁrm learned the type of its rival from its period 1 activity, the
early entrant doesn’t have such accurate information over its rival’s cost,
but the act of delaying does reveal some information so it should update its
belief about the support of the deferring ﬁrm’s marginal cost distribution.
As such, the Stackelberg game is a game of asymmetric information in which
the follower is perfectly informed. At the end of period 2 output and payoﬀs
become common knowledge and the incumbency advantage disappears so
in period 3 and all subsequent periods either the ﬁrms engage in Cournot
competition if the ﬁrm that deferred its investment decision invested, or the
early entrant maintains its position as the monopolist if not.
The beneﬁts from investing early are that the ﬁrm receives proﬁts from
production in the ﬁrst period and may, if its rival defers its investment deci-
sion and subsequently enters (given that demand rises), gain the advantage
of being a Stackelberg leader in the second period. However, by doing so it
exposes itself to losses should the level of demand fall.
Formally, we deﬁne the game as: G = (N,S,π), N = {A,B} is the set
of players. The inverse demand function at any period, t = 1,2,..., is given
by P(Qt,Θ(t)) = Θ(t) − Qt, Qt (= Qt,A + Qt,B) is the aggregate output,
(and Qt,A and Qt,B are compact, convex intervals in ℜ+∪{0}). The demand
intercept, Θ(t), follows a simple binomial process with expected value EΘ(t),
variance σ2, and state space in ℜ+∪{0}. The evolution of Θ(t) is similar to
a Markov process2 whose absorbing state is its value in period 2. Therefore,
(see Figure 1) demand remains at its period-2 level for all subsequent periods
after that.
Let P = {I,D}, which is the set of available actions in period 0. I
corresponds to sinking the investment cost K to enter the market in period
1. D corresponds to delaying the investment decision to period 2 at which
point the uncertainty about demand will be resolved, in which case (due
to the parameter restrictions we impose) the ﬁrm will invest to enter the
2In this setup, Pr(Θ(3) = δθ1|Θ(2) = νθ1,Θ(1) = θ1) = Pr(Θ(3) = δθ1|Θ(2) = νθ1),
where δ and ν take values u or d and 0 < d < 1 < u.
101 − p Θ(2) = dθ1
p Θ(2) = uθ1
Θ(1) = θ1
Θ(3) = uθ1
Θ(3) = dθ1
... Θ(n) = uθ1
... Θ(n) = dθ1
...
...
Figure 1: Binomial Process Depicting Stage 2 Evolution of Demand
market if and only if market demand is favourable (Θ(2) = uθ1). The set
of strategies for player i = A,B is Si = P × Ξi, where Ξi is the family of
functions that map ζi into Qt,i for each period t = 1,2,...; and ζi is the set
containing {(I,I),(I,D),(D,I) × Qt,j,(D,D)}. Deﬁne si = (σ,χt,i) ∈ Si,
where σ ∈ P and χt,i ∈ Ξi. Firm i’s pure strategy in any period t involves the
mapping χt,i : ζi → Qt,i, where t = 1,2,.... Having assumed that demand
takes the same level as in period 2 from period 3 onwards, and noting that
any relevant information will have been revealed by the beginning of period
3, it suﬃces to derive expressions of χt,i only for t = 1,2,3.
The appropriate solution concept for the extended game in this model,
which ultimately determines the value of the investment, is that of sequential
equilibrium introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982). The presence of non-
singleton information sets in games of incomplete information of this kind,
precludes subgame perfection, as there are no proper subgames. A sequential
equilibrium requires sequential rationality in the strategies, and that the
beliefs held by a ﬁrm at each information set it ﬁnds itself are consistent with
the strategy that got it there. Sequential rationality in our game requires
that, at each information set, the output choice of ﬁrm A is a best response
to the output choice of ﬁrm B, given ﬁrm A’s belief about the support of the
marginal cost distribution of the ﬁrm B. Also, the belief held by ﬁrm A about
the support of the marginal cost distribution of ﬁrm B, at any information
set consistent with the chosen strategy, must be derived by Bayes’ rule. In
contrast to the perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept, sequential equilibrium
speciﬁes how a ﬁrm should form beliefs when it reaches an out-of-equilibrium
information set. Because ﬁrms announce their chosen entry times in period
0, out-of-equilibrium signals may be sent in terms of outputs as well as
adoption periods. Therefore, to accurately obtain the expected value of
the investment for period 0 choice, we require sequential rationality and
consistency in the expected output choices of the ﬁrms in all periods. Thus,
11a strategy proﬁle (λ1(sA),λ2(sB)), for this game, is a sequential equilibrium
if for any sA and sB, such that for all (a,b) ∈ P, there exists a probability
distribution ˜ F over c(·) such that (a,b) is chosen to maximize expected proﬁts
(and hence, the value of the investment) given χA
t and χB
t ; also, given the
choice of adoption periods and given the ﬁrms’ beliefs at each information
set, χA
t and χB
t are chosen optimally; where the beliefs about the support
of the distribution of each other’s marginal cost held by the ﬁrms at each
information set are obtained by Bayes’ rule.
4 Continuation Game Analysis
At the beginning of period 0, ﬁrm A(B) faces only one source of uncer-
tainty regarding its decision in period 1, i.e. the marginal cost of ﬁrm B(A),
cB(A). In period 2, however, (looking forward from period 0), each ﬁrm
faces two sources of uncertainty, i.e., Θ(2) and its rival’s marginal cost. The
realization of Θ(2) is common knowledge at the beginning of period 2, and
marginal costs are revealed after period 1 or 2, or not at all (depending on
period-0 choices and the realization of Θ(2)). The parameters u and d gov-
erning the evolution of Θ(2) are related to the variance by: u = exp(σ
√
t)
and d = exp(−σ
√
t) (see Cox and Rubinstein (1979)). Payoﬀs in each pe-
riod represent cash ﬂows generated from output competition in the product
market.
The investment decision of each ﬁrm, in period 0, depends on its cal-
culation of the expected value of the investment opportunity at each entry
period t = 1,2,..., given the possible actions of the rival ﬁrm and its expec-
tation of Θ(t). This will be the entry choice that produces, in expectation,
the highest value of the investment that exceeds the initial investment out-
lay by an amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive.
The investment value, ϑ
(a,b)
(·) , for each possible outcome in period 0, is given
by the sum of the expected proﬁts in period 1 and the expected discounted
cash ﬂows of all future periods, minus the investment outlay, K.
Simultaneous-move Equilibria
If both ﬁrms choose to sink K in period 1, they play a Bayesian-Cournot
game in the early production period, and the basic Cournot in the sec-
ond period and all other periods after that. Let Eo(·) denote the expected
value of its argument given the information available in period 0 and let
qt,A ∈ Qt,A ⊆ ℜ+ ∪ {0} denote the output choice for ﬁrm A in period t.
It follows that, the ﬁrm may not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to produce outputs for
all realizations of its marginal cost. As a matter of fact, we assume (as
in Hurkens (2012)) that there exist some realizations of cA) for which the
12equilibrium output is 0. Therefore, ﬁrm A produces q∗
1,A = 1
6(2θ1 −¨ c−3cA)
in period 1 and earns π
∗(I,I)
1,A = 1
36(2θ1 − ¨ c − 3cA)2, where ¨ c =
  α
c cdF(c).
This integral is taken over an updated support of the marginal cost dis-
tribution, i.e., if A’s rival has chosen to invest early, A conjectures that
its rival’s marginal cost must be below some threshold α above which he
will rather delay if A invests. Therefore, ¨ c represents ﬁrm A’s mean belief
about his rival’s marginal cost. In period 2, having deduced its rival’s (ﬁrm
B’s) marginal cost, ﬁrm A produces q∗
2,A = 1
3(νθ1 − 2cA + cB) and earns
π
∗(I,I)
2,A = 1
9(νθ1 − 2cA + cB)2, where ν is either u or d, given the realization
of Θ(2). These are ex post outputs and payoﬀs. Ex ante, the expected value
of period-2 payoﬀ is Eo(π
∗(I,I)
2,A ) = 1
9(σ2+η2
¨ c +(puθ1+(1−p)dθ1+¨ c−2cA)2)
(see Appendix A for derivation). η2
¨ c is the variance of the marginal cost
derived from the updated support of its distribution. Period 3 and subse-
quent periods’ payoﬀs follow accordingly. The ex ante expected value of the
investment to this ﬁrm is therefore,
ϑ
(I,I)
A = γ1Eo(π
∗(I,I)
1,A ) + γ2Eo(π
∗(I,I)
2,A ) − K, (1)
where γ1 = 1/(1 + ρ) and γ2 = γ1/ρ.
If both ﬁrms choose period 2, i.e. (a,b) = (D,D), no production takes
place in period 1. Output choices are made based upon the observed realiza-
tion of Θ(2), and only when it is uθ1. Ex ante, this happens with probability
p, illustrating the fact that ﬁrms are not obligated to exercise their option to
invest if they ﬁnd it worthless. Marginal costs are still private information,
but by choosing to defer, a ﬁrm, say A, reveals information about its type.
Its rival, ﬁrm B, updates its belief about the support of the distribution of
ﬁrm A’s marginal cost, i.e. B believes that A’s true marginal cost must be
greater than the lower bound of the prior support of the distribution. The
updated lower bound corresponds to the value of cA, say β, that makes it
unproﬁtable for A to invest early if B defers. Bayesian updating, therefore,
requires B to put probability zero on all types of A below β. Let ˆ c be each
ﬁrm’s updated mean belief of their marginal costs (i.e. ˆ c =
  ¯ c
β cdF(c)).
A Bayesian-Cournot game ensues in the second period, while the basic
Cournot is played in subsequent periods. The ex ante expected value of the
investment is given by,
ϑ
(D,D)
A = p
 
−γ1K + γ1
2Eo(π
∗(D,D)
2,A ) + γ1γ2Eo(π
∗(D,D)
3,A )
 
. (2)
γ1 and γ2 are as previously speciﬁed. Period-2 payoﬀ, Eo(π
∗(D,D)
2,A ), is ((2uθ1+
ˆ c−3cA)2)/36, and expected payoﬀs for each of the subsequent periods after
13is ((uθ1 + ˆ c − 2cA)2)/9.
Sequential-move Equilibria
Choosing (I,D), as with (D,D), also reveals information about the type of
each ﬁrm. Suppose A chooses to enter early, and B defers, by choosing to
defer, B sends a signal about the lower bound of the support of its marginal
cost distribution, and A updates its belief about its rivals marginal cost
accordingly. In the asymmetric information game played in period 2, A’s
marginal cost is revealed, but A still has incomplete information about its
rival. However, A believes that B’s true marginal cost must lie in the interval
[α,¯ c] ⊂ [c,¯ c], where α is the inﬁmum of the the set of marginal costs for which
B ﬁnds it unproﬁtable to invest early if A invests early. Let ˘ c denote A’s
mean belief about the marginal cost of B based upon the updated support
of the marginal cost. The ﬁrst-mover’s expected payoﬀ stream is as follows:
Eo(π∗M
1,A) = ((θ1−cA)2)/4, Eo(π
∗(I,D)
2,A ) = (p(uθ1+˘ c−2cA)2)/8+((1−p)(dθ1−
cA)2)/4, and Eo(π
∗(I,D)
3,A ) = p((uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA)2)/9 + (1 − p)(dθ1 − cA)2)/4.
The corresponding expected value for the ﬁrst-mover is
ϑ
(I,D)
A =
 
γ1Eo(π∗M
1,A) + γ2
1Eo(π
∗(I,D)
2,A ) + 9γ1γ2Eo(π
∗(I,D)
3,A )
 
− K. (3)
Firm B’s expected payoﬀ stream if, and when, it enters is Eo(π
∗(I,D)
2,B ) =
((uθ1 − 2cB + 2˜ c − ˘ c)2)/16 and Eo(π
∗(I,D)
3,B ) = ((uθ1 − 2cB + ˜ c)2)/9, where
˜ c =
  β
c cdF(c) is B’s mean belief of about A’s marginal cost when he ob-
serves that A has chosen to invest early. The payoﬀs for all periods after
period 3 are equivalent to that of period 3. Let the superscripts M indicates
monopoly rent, then the follower’s expected value for the investment is,
ϑ
(I,D)
B = p
 
−γ1K + γ1
2Eo(π
∗(I,D)
2,B ) + γ1γ2Eo(π
∗(I,D)
3,B )
 
. (4)
When roles are reversed, these expected values are simply reversed as well.
It is not inconceivable that the sequential equilibria in this game may
indeed be separating and perfectly revealing. In fact, with the increasing
stringency on the regulations for ﬁnancial and accounting reports, it might
be diﬃcult and/or illegal for a ﬁrm to misrepresent information about its
costs and proﬁts. The ﬁrst part of our analyses assumes such environment.
Therefore, in the sequential play outcome, for instance, the follower in period
2 observes ﬁrst period (monopoly) payoﬀ of the leader and can accurately
infer his marginal cost (we have assumed the market clears after each pe-
riod). Also, the follower’s ex ante mean belief about the marginal cost of
14the leader uses the distribution’s full support, hence ˜ c, in its best response
function and in the derivation of the investment value, as seen above. In
eﬀect, it does not matter what the ﬁrst mover’s exact cost is, in expectation,
the follower’s reaction is the same. We assume that, should demand rise in
period 2, the market will be shared in a Stackelberg fashion, and also, that
there exists a ﬁrst-mover disadvantage should demand fall in period 2. In
Section 6, we illustrate, as a possible extension to this model, how the pos-
sibility of misrepresenting one’s type may change or inﬂuence outcomes in
this game.
5 Endogenous Timing
In this section we analyze the timing decisions of ﬁrms in the light of the
analysis undertaken above. We proceed as follows. Endogenous timing in
the game is based on type, i.e. marginal cost. Therefore, the marginal cost
draws of each ﬁrm at the beginning of the game determines what outcomes
emerge endogenously. Figure 2 represents the normal form of the extended
game.
Firm B
I D
Firm A I ϑ
(I,I)
A ,ϑ
(I,I)
B ϑ
(I,D)
A ,ϑ
(I,D)
B
D ϑ
(D,I)
A ,ϑ
(D,I)
B ϑ
(D,D)
A ,ϑ
(D,D)
B
Figure 2: Normal-Form Representation of the Game.
Lemma 1. For moderate levels of uncertainty, u:
(i) ∃ c1 ∈ [c,¯ c] ∋ ϑ(I,I) = ϑ(D,I), and
(ii) ∃ c2 ∈ [c,¯ c] ∋ ϑ(I,D) = ϑ(D,D)
The variance of demand provides a measure of the level of uncertainty
investors face. In binomial games of this kind, we are able to represent the
variance in terms of the model parameter u, i.e. σ2 = (ln(u))2. It there-
fore follows, that very high values of u indicates high levels of uncertainty,
and so, high cost ﬁrms are much more wary of committing early. Very low
values of u, on the other hand, diminishes the option value of waiting, in
this case, some high cost ﬁrms might ﬁnd it optimal to enter early. To de-
termine optimal choices for values of u that fall within these extremes, we
study the behaviour of the investment value functions. Firstly, it is easy to
15see that ϑ(I,I), ϑ(D,I), ϑ(I,D) and ϑ(D,D) are strictly convex, monotone de-
creasing functions of c on the interval I := [c,¯ c]. This is because these value
functions are monotone transformations of the individual equilibrium quan-
tities derived within each period, which are themselves strictly decreasing
and convex in the marginal cost. Secondly, and they satisfy the following
conditions:
a) ϑ(I,I)(0) > ϑ(D,I)(0), ϑ(I,D)(0) > ϑ(D,D)(0) and
b)
       
 
∂ϑ(I,I)
∂c
       
 
>
       
 
∂ϑ(D,I)
∂c
       
 
and
       
 
∂ϑ(I,D)
∂c
       
 
>
       
 
∂ϑ(D,D)
∂c
       
 
on I.
Let f1 = |∂ϑ(I,I)/∂c| − |∂ϑ(D,I)/∂c| and f2 = |∂ϑ(I,D)/∂c| − |∂ϑ(D,D)/∂c|.
f1 and f2 are simple linear monotonic decreasing function of c, and are
positive for all values of c on I such that ϑ(I,I) and ϑ(I,D) are non-negative
(see Appendix B for details);
c) if ξ0, ξ1, ε0 and ε1 are respectively the ”zeros” of ϑ(I,I), ϑ(D,I), ϑ(I,D)
and ϑ(D,D) on I, then ξ0 < ξ1, ε0 < ε1 and ξ0 < ε0 a.s.
The roots ξ0, ξ1, ε0 and ε1 of the value functions are themselves functions of
the beliefs held by the ﬁrms during the course of the game, i.e. α and β (see
Appendix B for details). Now, let g1(α,β) = ξ0 −ξ1 and g2(α,β) = ε0 −ε1;
we show in Appendix B that g1 and g2 are negative everywhere on I for all
values of α and β. Furthermore, ξ0 < ε0 on I, and so, ϑ(I,I) will always be
less than ϑ(I,D).
Now, since the functions ϑ(I,I), ϑ(D,I), ϑ(I,D) and ϑ(D,D) satisfy condi-
tions (a) and (b), along with strict convexity and monotonicity, then, there
must be two distinct points of intersection in I where ϑ(I,I) = ϑ(D,I) and
ϑ(I,D) = ϑ(D,D) respectively.
Lemma 2. The interval [c1,c2] is non-degenerate.
It is easily observed that if ξ0 < ε0 as in Lemma 1, the points c1 and
c2, corresponding to the intersections of the pair of value functions, do not
coincide, moreover, c1 < c2.
Figure 3 illustrates the critical regions on the interval I, within which
one or more of the outcomes in period 0 is dominant. These outcomes are
summarized in Table 1, and presented formally, in the propositions that
follow:
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Figure 3: Investment Values for Period-0 Outcomes
Firm A/Firm B cB < c1 c1 < cB < c2 cB > c2
cA < c1 I,I I,D I,D
c1 < cA < c2 D,I I,D; D,I I,D
cA > c2 D,I D,I D,D
Table 1:Belief-based Equilibria
Proposition 1. (Simultaneous-play Equilibrium). If both ﬁrms indepen-
dently draw marginal costs in the intervals [c,c1) and (c2,¯ c], the dominant
strategies are ﬁrst- and second-period simultaneous play equilibria respec-
tively.
Proposition 2. (Sequential-play Equilibrium). If the ﬁrms’ marginal cost
draws lie in separate regions delineated by c1 and c2, a sequential-play equi-
librium emerges as the dominant strategy; moreover, the more eﬃcient ﬁrm
emerges endogenously as the ﬁrst-mover.
Proposition 3. When both ﬁrms independently draw marginal costs in the
interval (c1,c2), ex ante, there is a mixed strategy in which ﬁrms randomize
over I and D, and an (anti)-coordination problem ensues when they use the
same mixed strategy.
Proofs for Proposition 1 and 2 follow directly from Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, and the summary in Table 1. See Appendix B for proof of
Proposition 3.
176 Discussion
As is evidenced from Table 1, the choice of roles in this game is governed
by the ﬁrms’ types through the critical thresholds c1 and c2. These thresh-
olds are parametrized by the level of demand uncertainty and the beliefs
of the ﬁrms. Quite unlike Smit and Trigeorgis (1995), investment timing is
not solely determined by the level of demand, and more so, a more eﬃcient
ﬁrm may not necessarily emerge endogenously as the ﬁrst mover (as in case
”c∗” of the analogous framework of Smit and Trigeorgis (1995) , where the
strategic investment is proprietary). The belief-based equilibria we have de-
rived in this paper show that what outcomes emerge endogenously depends
primarily on the side of the critical thresholds c1 and c2, the ﬁrms’ marginal
costs lie, the values of which are estimatable at the start of the game. Simple
cost(type) asymmetry is insuﬃcient, therefore, to describe outcomes when
there is private information about types under demand uncertainty. The
import of private information in investment games of this nature is clearly
non-trivia. For example, if both ﬁrms draw marginal costs in the intervals
described in Proposition 1, then symmetric or not, the optimal outcome
is simultaneous investment. On the other hand, no matter how close cB
might be to cA, if cA < c1 < cB, then ﬁrm B’s dominant strategy is to delay.
A leader-follower equilibrium emerges endogenously only when their types
are suﬃciently asymmetric as in Proposition 2. Proposition 3 shows an
outcome that diﬀer from that of Smit and Trigeorgis (1995) where a more
eﬃcient ﬁrm never chooses to defer if its rival invests. As we have shown,
this interval is non-degenerate and does not collapse into a null set as their
model speciﬁes. Ex post, we may, therefore, ﬁnd a more eﬃcient ﬁrm emerg-
ing as the second-mover. The intuition behind this is that when a ﬁrm draws
a type that falls in this interval, it realizes that its dominant strategy is to
defer if its rival invests, and to invest, if its rival defers. Unlike in the inter-
vals [c,c1) and (c2,¯ c] where a ﬁrm’s dominant strategy is to invest and defer
respectively, irrespective of what its rival chooses; in the interval (c1,c2),
each ﬁrm’s optimal strategy is conditional on its rival choosing the exact
opposite. But ﬁrm in this interval has not knowledge of its rival’s marginal
cost, and therefore, must use a mixed strategy. We show in the Appendix
A that if both ﬁrms use the same mixed strategy the (anti)-coordination
problem will still persists.
A ﬁrm’s dominant strategies evolve across the type space, and the value
of its option to defer investment increasing with the type it draws. For a ﬁrm
with suﬃciently large marginal cost, deferring commitment decision until
the second period, at which time some, or all, of the uncertainty elements
of the game are resolved, becomes increasingly preferred. As the option
18value increases, the ﬁrst-mover advantage decreases. Also, ∂c1/∂u < 0 and
∂c2/∂u < 0 for any given level of demand, meaning that the sub-spaces of
the type-space where a ﬁrst-mover advantage exists shrink with uncertainty
for the a more eﬃcient ﬁrm.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents a baseline investment game of incomplete informa-
tion under uncertainty, where product market competition inﬂuences the
state value of the investment, and timing is endogenously determined. We
have shown that cost asymmetry is insuﬃcient criterion upon which out-
comes may be determined when there is private information over types (see
Dewit and Leahy (2001), where cost asymmetry is used to determine market
structure in an investment game with observable delay under demand uncer-
tainty). Consequently, a ﬁrst-mover advantage may not exist for suﬃciently
large draw of types, and when it does, it diminishes with type and with the
level of uncertainty. The sequential equilibrium concept employed ensures
that even when a ﬁrm deﬁes the requirement of the game with observable
delay (i.e. does not commit to its period 0 choice), the rival ﬁrm, ﬁnding
itself on an oﬀ-equilibrium path is able to form beliefs consistent with how
he may have arrived at this information set and update its belief about the
defecting ﬁrm’s type appropriately.
An important assumption that drives the results in this paper is that
the market clears in each period of production, and each period’s payoﬀs
are observed before the next period’s output choices are made. However,
an immediate extension to our model is to consider how the game might
evolve if the ﬁrst mover is able to credibly mask his type. In order to pursue
this ideal, the ﬁrms may only be able to observe outputs and not payoﬀs in
this particular world. This may be considered under two categories. One, is
where the ﬁrst mover can mask his type and the follower believes it. Two, is
where the follower knows that the ﬁrst mover may mask his type, and then
modify his actions accordingly. Interestingly, the outcomes in both cases are
similar. In the ﬁrst case, we ﬁnd that if the ﬁrst mover shades his cost by
the factor ̺, where 0 < ̺ < 1, then the beneﬁt he derives from “fooling”,
as it were, his rival into considering him more eﬃcient in the Cournot game
in period 3 outweighs the temporary loss in revenue he would experience
in period 1 and 2. The net present value of this beneﬁt is concave in the
amount, ̺, with which he shades his cost. In the second case, even though
the potential follower realizes that the ﬁrst mover may be lying about his
type, as a Stackelberg follower in period 2, his optimal action is to best
respond to the leaders output, whether it be a lie or not. Having deduced
19the cost relevant to the leaders output in the second period, the third period
Cournot game proceeds accordingly at which point the true marginal cost
of the ﬁrst mover is then revealed. The Cournot competition in subsequent
periods progress as with when both ﬁrms have been truthful all along.
Our conjecture is that, this additional incentive to move ﬁrst (being able
to beneﬁt from lying) may not qualitatively alter the speciﬁcations of our
game. The quantitative implication may be that it reduces the values of
the critical thresholds that determine the outcomes of the game. We leave
the determination of the value of the investment and the speciﬁcs of the ex
post market structures that emerge endogenously when masking ones type
is possible as the subject of future research.
Appendix A
Equilibrium Outputs, Payoﬀs and Investment Value
Simultaneous-move Equilibria
If at the decision period (period-0), both ﬁrms choose to sink the investment
outlay, K, in period 1, i.e. (a,b) = (I,I), then a Bayesian-Cournot game
ensues in period 1 since marginal costs are still private information. Fur-
thermore, as we have not made the common assumption that qt(c) > 0 for
all realizations of c, therefore, there exists some realizations of c for which
the equilibrium output is 0 (see Hurkens (2012)). The ﬁrms, being ex ante
symmetric, and having independently drawn their marginal costs, will be
maximizing expected proﬁts over an adjusted support of the marginal cost
distribution as follows (we show this for ﬁrm A):
max
q1,A(cA)
E(π
(I,I)
1,A ) = max
q1,A(cA)
(q1,A (θ1 − q1,A − E(q1,B(cB)) − cA)) (A1)
For notational convenience, we will be using q1,A for q1,A(cA) with the
understanding that output decisions are functions of drawn marginal cost
values. Firm A’s expectation of B’s output in (A1) is based on the belief
that there is a marginal cost threshold value, α, above which A, itself, will
ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to enter the market in period 1 (and hence produce zero
output). As the ﬁrms are ex ante symmetric, ﬁrm A believes this to be true
of its rival, ﬁrm B. It therefore follows from (A1) that
ˆ q1,A =
1
2
(θ1 − E(q1,B(cB)) − cA) and ˆ q1,B =
1
2
(θ1 − E(q1,A(cA)) − cB)
(A2)
20Ex ante, E(ˆ q1,A) = E(ˆ q1,B). Hence, E(ˆ q1,B) = 1
2 (θ1 − E(q1,A(cA)) − E(cB)).
Note that E(cB) =
  α
c cBdF(cB) := ¨ c, where α ∈ (c,¯ c]. Expected outputs
for independent draws of marginal costs in this interval is
E(q1,B) = 1
2 (θ1 − E(q1,A(cA)) − ¨ c). (A3)
Since expected outputs for both ﬁrms are taken over the same support, ﬁrm
B should therefore expect that E(q1,B) = E(q1,A). Using this in (A3), we
have
E(q1,B) =
θ1 − ¨ c
3
= E(q1,A) (A4)
Substituting (A4) for the expectations in (A2), the equilibrium outputs for
the ﬁrms are hence,
q∗
1,A =
1
6
(2θ1 − ¨ c − cA) and q∗
1,B =
1
6
(2θ1 − ¨ c − cB) (A5)
The corresponding expected equilibrium payoﬀs are,
π
∗(I,I)
1,A = 1
36 (2θ1 − ¨ c − cA)
2 and π
∗(I,I)
1,B = 1
36 (2θ1 − ¨ c − cB)
2 . (A6)
At the beginning of period 2, outputs and payoﬀs from period 1 would
have been observed, therefore, the true marginal costs of each ﬁrm can
be deduced. The demand level for period 2 is also observed at the start
of the period. Having chosen (I,I) in period 0, the ﬁrms compete a l` a
Cournot from period 2 onwards, having full information about the market
parameters. Equilibrium outputs and payoﬀs in period 2 are
q∗
2,A = 1
3 (θ2 − 2cA + cB) and π
∗(I,I)
1,A = 1
9 (θ2 − 2cA + cB)
2 . (A7)
Note, however, that these are ex post outputs and payoﬀs, so θ2 in (A7) is
either uθ1 or dθ1 (because Θ follows a binomial process from period 2). In
order to derive the expected net present value of the investment, we require
ex ante expectations of the payoﬀs as follows
21Eo(π
∗(I,I)
2,A ) = Eo
 
1
9
 
Θ(2) − 2cA + cB
 2 
=
1
9
 
Var(Θ(2) + (cB − 2cA)) +
 
Eo
 
Θ(2) − 2cA + cB
  2 
=
1
9
 
σ2
(Θ(2)) + η¨ c + (puθ1 + (1 − p)dθ1 + ¨ c − 2cA)2
 
.
(A8)
Where η¨ c is the variance of the marginal cost distribution over the adjusted
support. At period 0, the level of demand in period 2 is not known with
certainty, and the marginal cost of the ﬁrm’s rival is still private information,
hence the expectations in (A8). Period 3, and subsequent periods’ payoﬀs
follow (A8), therefore, the expected net present value of the investment at
the time of decision is
ϑ
(I,I)
A =
1
1 + ρ
 
1
36
(2θ1 − ¨ c − 3cA)
2
 
+
1
9ρ(1 + ρ)
 
σ2
(Θ(2)) + η¨ c + (puθ1 + (1 − p)dθ1 + ¨ c − 2cA)2
 
− K.
(A9)
Putting γ1 = 1/(1 + ρ) and γ2 = γ1/ρ in (A9) gives the expression in (1).
When both ﬁrms keep the option to delay alive until period 2, (i.e.
(a,b) = (D,D)), then, given that demand rises in period 2, (i.e. θ2 = uθ1
with probability p), they simultaneously enter the market. However, while
marginal costs remain private information, each ﬁrm conjectures that the
choice to delay implies that its rival’s true marginal cost must lie in some
interval (β,¯ c], where β is the upper bound of the marginal cost distribution
support below which ﬁrst period entry is proﬁtable. The ﬁrms, therefore,
put zero probabilities on all types within this interval.
Although second period demand level has now been observed, a Bayesian-
Cournot game is played again in period 2 since marginal costs are still private
information. The basic Cournot game is then played in all other periods af-
ter 2. Ex ante expected output and payoﬀ in period 2 are
q
∗(D,D)
2,A = 1
6 (2uθ1 + ˆ c − 3cA) and π
∗(D,D)
2,A = 1
36 (2uθ1 + ˆ c − 3cA)
2 ,
(A10)
where ˆ c =
  ¯ c
β cAdF(cA). Firm B’s output and payoﬀ are similarly deter-
mined.
Expected output and payoﬀ in period 3 and all other periods after that
22are
q
∗(D,D)
3,A = 1
3 (uθ1 + ˆ c − 2cA) and π
∗(D,D)
3,A = 1
9 (uθ1 + ˆ c − 2cA)
2 ,
(A11)
and the value of the investment when the option is kept alive until period 2
is given by
ϑ
(D,D)
A = p(−k1K +
γ2
1
36 (2uθ1 + ˆ c − 3cA)
2 +
γ1γ2
9 (uθ1 + ˆ c − 2cA)
2). (A12)
γ1 and γ2 are as previously deﬁned.
Sequential-move Equilibria
A number of scenarios play out when the ﬁrms choose to enter the market
at diﬀerent times. It suﬃces to consider the case for ﬁrm A entering early
and ﬁrm B diﬀering until period 2 before deciding to enter or not. After
these choices are made and observed, ﬁrm A invests in period 1 and acts as
a monopolist. His equilibrium output and payoﬀ are
q
∗(I,D)
1,A = 1
2 (θ1 − cA) and π
∗(I,D)
1,A = 1
4 (θ1 − cA)
2 . (A13)
Firm B incurs no sunk cost and earns nothing in this period. Should demand
rise in period 2, ﬁrm B exercises its right to enter the market and acts as a
Stackelberg follower. Firm A, having observed that B has chosen to defer ,
conjectures that B’s marginal cost must lie in the interval [α,¯ c] ⊂ [c,¯ c]. A
maximizes its Stackelberg leader payoﬀ given the expected reaction function
of B as follows,
max
q2,A
E(π
(I,D)
2,A ) = max
q2,A
{q2,A (uθ1 − q2,A − E(ˆ q2,B(cB)) − cA)}
= max
q2,A
{q2,A
 
uθ1 − q2,A −
 
uθ1 − q2,A − ˘ c
2
 
− cA
 
}.
(A14)
Where ˘ c =
  ¯ c
α cBdF(cB). Solving (A14) and substituting into the follower’s
optimization problem yield the expected equilibrium outputs:
q
∗(I,D)
2,A = 1
2 (uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA) and q
∗(I,D)
2,B = 1
4 (uθ1 − 2cB + 2˜ c − ˘ c).
(A15)
23Their respective corresponding expected payoﬀs are
π
∗(I,D)
2,A = 1
8(uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA)2 and π
∗(I,D)
2,B = 1
16(uθ1 − 2cB + 2˜ c − ˘ c)2.
(A16)
Marginal costs and demand level is now revealed and the basic Cournot
game is played from period 3 onwards. The expected outputs and payoﬀs
produced and earned respectively in each of these periods are:
q
∗(I,D)
3,A = 1
3 (uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA) and q
∗(I,D)
3,B = 1
3 (uθ1 + ˜ c − 2cB),
(A17)
and
π
∗(I,D)
3,A = 1
9(uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA)2 and π
∗(I,D)
3,B = 1
9(uθ1 + ˜ c − 2cB)2.
(A18)
˜ c in the expressions above is
  ¯ c
c cAdF(cA) (i.e. the expected value of ﬁrm
A’s marginal cost over the full support of its distribution). The expected
value of the investment for each ﬁrm is given by,
ϑ
(I,D)
A = γ1
θ1 − cA
4
+ γ2
1
 
p(uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA)2
8
+
(1 − p)(dθ1 − cA)2
4
 
+ 9γ1γ2
 
p(uθ1 + ˘ c − 2cA)2
9
+
(1 − p)(dθ1 − cA)2
4
 
− K
(A19)
and
ϑ
(I,D)
B = p
 
−k1K + k2
1
(uθ1 − 2cB + 2˜ c − ˘ c)2
16
+ k1k2
(uθ1 + ˜ c − 2cB)2
9
 
.
(A20)
Appendix B
Given that the value functions themselves are monotone decreasing and
convex in over the support of the marginal cost distribution, it suﬃces,
therefore, that along with conditions (a), (b) and (c), the claims in Lemma
1 hold. First, we show that f1 and f2 are positive everywhere on the support
of the marginal cost distribution as follows.
(A9) and (A20) give the expected value of the investment when period
0 choices are respectively (I,I) and (D,I). Note that (A20) refers to the
24value of the investment to a ﬁrm who choses to defer, when its rival enters
early. If p = 1/2 and the marginal cost expectations are evaluated over a
continuous uniform distribution we obtain
ϑ(I,I) =
 α
2
− 3c + 2θ1
 2
36(1 + ρ)
+
α2
12
+
 
α
2
− 2c +
uθ1
2
+
θ
2u
 2
+ ln(u)2
9ρ(1 + ρ)
− K
(B1)
and
ϑ(D,I) =
1
2


 

 
1
2
(−α − 10) + β − 2c + uθ1
 2
16(1 + ρ)2 +
 
β
2
− 2c + uθ1
 2
9ρ(1 + ρ)2 −
K
1 + ρ


 

.
(B2)
Without loss of generality, let [c,¯ c] = [0,1]. This implies that α,β ∈ [0,1].
f1 =
     
   
∂ϑ(I,I)
∂c
     
   
−
     
   
∂ϑ(D,I)
∂c
     
   
=
1
144uρ(1 + ρ)2
 
32θ1 + (32θ1 + u(90 + 53α − 18β + 48θ1 + 14uθ1
− 164c))ρ + 12u(α + 4θ1 − 6c)ρ2 − 16u(2α + β − 4c)
 
.
(B3)
It is easy to see that f1 is linear in c and diﬀerentiable on [0,1], Also,
f1(0) > f1(1) ≥ 0. Furthermore,
∂f1
∂c
= −
(1 + 2ρ)(16 + 9ρ)
36ρ(1 + ρ)2 . (B4)
Notice that (B4) is independent of c. Also, 0 < ρ < 1, therefore, given (B4),
and the fact that f1(0) > f1(1) ≥ 0, we see that f1 is monotonic decreasing
and non-negative for all c in I, where ϑ(I,I) ≥ 0.
Similarly, f2 = |∂ϑ(I,D)/∂c| − |∂ϑ(D,D)/∂c| > 0 for all c in I where
ϑ(I,D) ≥ 0. f2 is diﬀerentiable on [0,1] and f2(0) > f2(1) ≥ 0. Moreover, it
is linear and monotonic decreasing as shown in (B5).
∂f2
∂c
= −
1 + 2ρ(2 + ρ)
4ρ(1 + ρ)2 . (B5)
This veriﬁes condition (b) of Lemma 1.
For condition (b), we begin by noting that g1(α,β) = (ϑ(I,I))−1(0) −
25(ϑ(D,I))−1(0) and g2(α,β) = (ϑ(I,D))−1(0) − (ϑ(D,D))−1(0). Again, WLOG,
we let [c,¯ c] = [0,1]. Solving for the roots of ϑ(I,I) and ϑ(D,I), and taking the
diﬀerence, we have
g1(α,β) =
−3245 − 534β − 8
√
15
 
49977 + 36α − 86α2 − 1014ln
 3
2
 2
2028
+
525α + 36
√
10
 
3718 − (1 + α − β)2
2028
( set α = 1 and β = 0 in the numerator of the above expression )
< −
10156.58 + 7466.56
2028
= −
2690.02
2028
< 0.
(B6)
Using α = 1 and β = 0 in the numerator of the ﬁrst line in (B6) minimizes
the absolute value of the negative part of it, whilst maximizing the absolute
value of positive part. This allows us to obtain the inequality in the line
that followed. In the same vein, we have it that,
g2(α,β) =
17989 + 445α −
√
55
 
2278765 − 267α(34 + 9α)
2968
+
−2147 − 83β + 2
√
10
 
32933 − (−46 + β)β
338
( set α = 1 and β = 0 in the numerators of the above expression )
< −
11166.94
2968
+
18434
2968
−
2147
338
+
1147.75
338
≈ 2.44 − 2.97
< 0.
(B7)
Again, putting α = 1 and β = 0 minimizes the absolute values of the
negative terms of the ﬁrst line of expression in (B7), whilst maximizing the
positive terms of it.
To conclude the veriﬁcation of condition (c) of Lemma 1, we let h =
ϑ(I,I))−1(0) − ϑ(I,D))−1(0), and show that h < 0 on [0,1].
26We have
h =
−2519591 − 5936
√
15
 
49977 + 36α − 86α2 − 1014ln
 3
2
 2
1504776
+
143901α + 507
√
55
 
2278765 − 267α(34 + 9α)
1504776
.
(B8)
Recall that α represents the believe a ﬁrm holds about its rival’s marginal
cost, given his period-0 choice, and it lies in the interval [0,1]. Moreover,
h is linear in α, therefore, it suﬃces to show that if h(α = 0) < 0 and
h(α = 1) < 0, then h is negative everywhere on the interval [0,1]. From
(B8), h(0) ≈ −1974599.68 and h(1) ≈ −1842439.30.
Lastly, whenever θ takes on a value that produce a non-negative price,
and α and β are chosen to minimize ϑ(I,I)(0) − ϑ(D,I)(0) and ϑ(I,D)(0) −
ϑ(D,D)(0) as shown above, these expressions respectively yield 7482895/313632+
100/99ln
 3
2
 2 and 5067665/17424, which proves condition (a).
Proposition 3 (Mixed Strategy Equilibrium)
Having established Lemma 1 and 2, and using Table 1, a ﬁrm, say A, is
able to determine ex ante that
a. If cA < c1, then regardless of cB it is a dominant strategy to play I.
Since ϑ
I,I
A > ϑ
D,I
A and ϑ
I,D
A > ϑ
D,D
A .
b. If cA > c2, then regardless of cB it is a dominant strategy to play D.
Since ϑ
D,I
A > ϑ
I,I
A and ϑ
D,D
A > ϑ
I,D
A .
Question is: how should the ﬁrm behave if c1 < cA < c2? Now, if
cB < c1 then B will play I and therefore, since ϑ
D,I
A > ϑ
I,I
A , ﬁrm A should
play D. On the other hand, if cB > c1 then B will play D and therefore,
since ϑ
I,D
A > ϑ
D,D
A , ﬁrm A should play I. If c1 < cB < c2 then ϑ
D,I
A > ϑ
I,I
A
and ϑ
I,D
A > ϑ
D,D
A (and similarly for B, so the ﬁrms will (anti)-coordinate,
and there will be an equilibrium in mixed strategies).
But when making its decision, ﬁrm A does not observe ﬁrm B’s draw
from the cost distribution, so it must base its assessment of what is the
best strategy on its prior belief (knowing that, for cost draws in the same
region, B will be doing the same thing). So, when c1 < cA < c2 and without
observing its rival’s cost draw, A will have to formulate its strategies in a
manner consistent with its beliefs as follows.
Suppose cB < c1 with probability p1, cB > c2 with probability p2 and
c1 < cB < c2 with probability 1 − p1 − p2. Then, A can ﬁnd a certain
probability φ for which its dominant strategy is I when cB < c1 and cB > c2.
However, when c1 < cB < c2, ﬁrm B formulates a similar strategy with a
27certain probability ψ. Therefore, when c1 < cA < c2 and c1 < cB < c2, ﬁrm
A must expect (I,I) with probability φψ, (I,D) with φ(1−ψ), (D,I) with
(1−φ)ψ), and (D,D) with (1−φ)(1−ψ). It is clear that whenever φ = ψ,
the ﬁrms will (anti)-coordinate.
To ﬁnd φ and ψ, we maximize the expected value of the investment with
respect to φ and ψ in the following way,
max
0≤φ≤1
EAΠ = max
0≤φ≤1
{ϑ
I,I
A (p1φ + φψ(1 − p1 − p2))
+ ϑ
I,D
A (p2φ + φ(1 − ψ)(1 − p1 − p2))
+ ϑ
D,I
A ((1 − φ)p1 + (1 − φ)ψ(1 − p1 − p2))
+ ϑ
D,D
A ((1 − φ)p2 + (1 − φ)(1 − ψ)(1 − p1 − p2))}
(B9)
and
max
0≤ψ≤1
EBΠ = max
0≤ψ≤1
{ϑ
I,I
B (p1ψ + φψ(1 − p1 − p2))
+ ϑ
I,D
B (p2ψ + ψ(1 − φ)(1 − p1 − p2))
+ ϑ
D,I
B ((1 − ψ)p1 + (1 − ψ)φ(1 − p1 − p2))
+ ϑ
D,D
B ((1 − ψ)p2 + (1 − ψ)(1 − φ)(1 − p1 − p2))}
(B10)
Deriving the FOCs for B9 and B10 and solving for ψ and φ respectively
yields,
ψ∗ =
(1 − p1 − p2)
 
ϑ
I,I
A − ϑ
I,D
A − ϑ
D,I
A + ϑ
D,D
A
 
p1(ϑ
D,I
A − ϑ
I,I
A ) + p2(ϑ
D,D
A − ϑ
I,D
A ) + (1 − p1 − p2)(ϑ
D,D
A − ϑ
I,D
A )
(B11)
and
φ∗ =
(1 − p1 − p2)
 
ϑ
I,I
B − ϑ
I,D
B − ϑ
D,I
B + ϑ
D,D
B
 
p1(ϑ
D,I
B − ϑ
I,I
B ) + p2(ϑ
D,D
B − ϑ
I,D
B ) + (1 − p1 − p2)(ϑ
D,D
B − ϑ
I,D
B )
(B12)
Therefore, in the interval (c1,c2), A and B’s mixed strategies are respec-
tively (φ∗,(1 − φ∗)) and (ψ∗,(1 − ψ∗)).
28References
Amir, R. (1995). Endogenous Timing in Two-player Games: A Counter
Example. Games and Economic Behavior, 9:234–237.
Cox, J., R. S. and Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option Pricing: A Simpliﬁed
Approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7:229 –263.
Dewit, G. and Leahy, D. (2001). Fighting over uncertain demand: Invest-
ment commitment versus ﬂexibility. Economics, ﬁnance and accounting
department working paper series, Department of Economics, Finance and
Accounting, National University of Ireland - Maynooth.
Dixit, A. and Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton
University Press, New Jersey.
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1984). The fat-cat eﬀect, the puppy-dog ploy,
and the lean and hungry look. The American Economic Review, 74:361–
366.
Gal-Or, E. (1987). First Mover Disadvantages with Private Information.
The Review of Economic Studies, 54:279–292.
Hamilton, J. and Slutsky, S. (1990). Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Games:
Stackelberg or Cournot Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior, 2:29–
46.
Huisman, K. and Kort, P. (1999). Eﬀects of Strategic Interactions on the
Option Value of Waiting. Working paper, Tilburg University.
Hurkens, S. (2012). Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in ”Linear” Cournot Models
with Private Information about Cost. Ufae and iae working papers, Unitat
de Fonaments de l’Anlisi Econmica (UAB) and Institut d’Anlisi Econmica
(CSIC).
Kreps, D. and Wilson, R. (1982). Sequential Equilibria. Econometrica,
50:863–894.
Mailath, G. (1993). Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions. Journal of
Economic Theory, 59:169 – 182.
Masaaki, K. and Takashi, S. (2005). Real Options in an Oligopoly Market.
The Kyoto Economic Review, 35:47–64.
Normann, H.-T. (2002). Endogenous Timing with Incomplete Information
and with Observable Delay. Games and Economic Behavior, 39:282–291.
29Sadanand, A. and Sadanand, V. (1996). Firm Scale and the Endogenous
Timing of Entry: a Choice between Commitment and Flexibility. Journal
of Economic Theory, 70:516–530.
Smit, H. and Ankum, L. (1993). A Real Options and Game-Theoretic Ap-
proach to Corporate Investment Stratetegy under Competition. Financial
Management, 22:241 – 250.
Smit, H. and Trigeorgis, L. (1995). Flexibility and Commitment in Strategic
Investment. Tinbergen Institute.
Takashima, R., Goto, M., and Madarame, H. (2007). Entry into the Electric-
ity Market: Uncertainty, Competition, and Mothballing Options. Energy
Economics, 30(4):1809–1830.
30